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INTRODUCTION
This paper is aimed at explaining the change of Turkey’s
foreign policy strategy in the Syrian crisis. Understanding
the behavior of a country in regional politics through a
foreign policy analysis is necessary to discern the questions
more comprehensively since the analysis may involve not
only international but also domestic factors. It means the
analysis will find out the interacting units which resulted
in a foreign policy decision (Mas’oed, 1989). Turkey be-
gan to change its foreign policy strategy in Syrian crisis
two years ago. It encouraged the investigation of what
caused Turkey to make such decision after its controver-
sial involvement in the stalemated conflict. Furthermore,
there are not yet any comprehensive or research-based
sources providing the information as expected.
The beginning of Turkey engagement in Syrian domes-
tic crisis in 2011 has been considered a determined re-
gional actor was influencing the dynamics within the coun-
try and region. Turkey is one of the most active actors in
Turkey’s Foreign Policy Strategy Change
in Syrian Crisis (2016-2017)
Luerdi, Alfajri
Department of International Relations
Universitas Abdurrab
Jl. Riau Ujung No. 73, Pekanbaru 28291 Indonesia
luerdi@univrab.ac.id
Submitted: January 22, 2018; accepted: July 16, 2018
Abstrak
Turki merupakan salah satu aktor penting yang perannya tidak dapat dipisahkan dalam memahami dinamika krisis Suriah. Turki melakukan
intervensi di Suriah untuk mengganti rezim yang berkuasa dengan mendukung kelompok oposisi dan membangun aliansi dengan negara-
negara barat. Turki mulai merubah strategi politik luar negerinya pada 2016, namun tetap mempertahankan kepentingannya berupa keamanan
dan stabilitas. Tulisan ini bertujuan menjelaskan hubungan antara faktor-faktor penyebab dan perubahan strategi politik luar negeri Turki di
Suriah. Pendekatan yang digunakan adalah pendekatan pembuatan kebijakan luar negeri dan teori pembuatan kebijakan James Rosenau
yang mencakup berbagai determinan seperti lingkungan internal, eksternal, penilaian informasi dan proses pembuatan kebijakan yang
kemudian melahirkan output berupa kebijakan politik luar negeri. Temuan dalam tulisan ini menunjukkan faktor-faktor domestik dan
internasional mendorong Turki merubah strategi politik luar negerinya. Adapun bentuk strategi tersebut adalah Turki berkolaborasi dengan
Rusia dalam mengupayakan resolusi konflik dan mengakhiri konflik antara rezim Suriah dan kelompok oposisi.
Kata kunci: krisis Suriah, politik luar negeri, teori pembuatan kebijakan, perubahan strategi.
Abstract
Turkey is one of the significant actors whose roles cannot be ignored in understanding the dynamics of the Syrian crisis. Turkey used to
interfere the neighboring country to remove the Syrian regime by backing the opposition groups and building alliance with the western
countries. Turkey began to change its foreign policy strategy in Syria in 2016, but still maintained its domestic security and stability interest.
This paper is aimed to explain the relationship between the driving factors and Turkey’s foreign policy strategy change. This article applied the
foreign policy decision-making approach where determinants were perceived and acted upon by the official governmental decision-makers.
James Rosenau’s decision-making theory was employed to strengthen the approach, consisting of some foreign policy determinants such as
external environment, internal environment, information assessment and decision-making process which further affect decision-makers to
make the state’s foreign policy as the decision output. The finding showed that domestic and international factors encouraged Turkey to
change its foreign policy strategy. The new strategy was the collaboration of Turkey and Russia in seeking the resolution to create stability
within Syria and put an end of the severe conflict.
Keywords: Syrian crisis, foreign policy, decision-making process, strategy change.
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the Middle East and had deployed its resources in the con-
flict which then instigated criticisms from not only other
countries but also home opposition parties. Turkey’s stance
against the Syrian regime raised after the government used
chemical weapons to beat the opposition groups. Not only
did Turkey assist the inception and organization of the
opposition groups into Syrian National Council/Coalition
(SNC) and Free Syria Army (FSA), it has also been hosting
the two main Syrian opposition elements (Luerdi, 2015).
Expecting the regime change in Syria was an uncertain
outcome for Turkey that both regional and extra-regional
actors, which were Assad’s allies in strengthening his presi-
dency, extended their interests in the conflict as well. Since
the conflict was the assemblage variety of interests, the
conflict resolution was hardly achieved, or even to satisfy
the conflicting parties and failed Turkey’s ambition to re-
move the Syrian regime. Instead, the domestic conflict
within Syria was intensifying with the emergence of more
armed groups. Due to its foreign policy, Turkey harmed
its diplomatic relationship with Russia especially after
Turkish military shot down Russian aircraft near Turkey-
Syria border (Kirici & Ekim, 2016). The worse thing was
the conflict able to enter its territory.
The devastating crisis and complicated situation in Syria
urged Turkey to reconsider its involvement. Turkey still
needed to advocate its main interest even though it had to
change the direction of its foreign policy. Turkey came to
another practical strategy which was a result of some con-
siderations, the combination of what it perceived the im-
portance of domestic stability and the uncertain geopoli-
tics in Syria.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
This article applied the approach of foreign policy
making to answer the purposes designed. Foreign policy-
making in the Middle East can only be adequately under-
stood by analyzing of multiple factors common to all states
such as foreign policy determinants to which decision-
makers respond when they shape policies and foreign policy
structures or processes. It is to identify which factor of the
inputs made by various actors into a policy by addressing
these determinants (Hinnebusch, 2013). Such determi-
nants perceived and acted upon by the official governmen-
tal decision-makers. Only then could the determinants be
considered to have affected foreign policy (Jensen, 1982).
This article applied the theory of foreign policy deci-
sion-making proposed by James Rosenau. Decision-mak-
ing approach has been very useful since it provides frame-
works of analysis in explaining foreign policy. It does not
mean that there has been an established empirical theory
of foreign policy decision-making, whether general or even
partial due to the existence of different frameworks
(Korany, 1986). James Rosenau’s decision-making theory
consists of some determinants such as the external envi-
ronment, internal environment, information assessment
and decision-making process which further affect decision-
makers to make the state’s decision or foreign policy as
the output.
The internal environment referred to Turkey’s domes-
tic security and stability. Turkey’s intervention in Syria
brought the conflict to its domestic level. The armed group
like the ISIS had been threatening Turkey’s stability with
bombing actions since the government decided to support
the Syrian opposition groups to fight them in Syria. Be-
sides, Turkey had to face the growing activities and the
increasing power of Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) which
affiliated to Syrian Kurd group, called the Democratic
Union Party (PYD) in Northern Syria due to its political
activism and opposition to the Kurd autonomous area of
Syria. The Turkish government was just threatened by a
coup plotted by Fethullah Gulen and his FETO organiza-
tion whose purpose was the regime change in Turkey
(Anadolu, 2016). Those internal factors mattered since they
were able to threaten and disturb Turkey’s home stability
and security.
The external environment referred to external powers’
stands on the Syrian crisis and Turkey’s domestic politics.
Russia was the main backer of Assad, playing its roles in
rejecting the regime change in Syria by deploying its sig-
nificant supports. Russia enjoyed its increasing influence
in Syria, especially after the United States (US) withdrawal
from the demand of Syrian regime change and growing a
concern with the ISIS rather than the intervention against
the regime. This policy was followed by the European
Union (EU) which once rejected Turkey’s no-flying zone
demand in Syria (Pierini, 2016). The US supported the
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PYD in fighting the ISIS which in turn, threatened Turkey’s
interest. Regarding Turkey’s domestic politics aftermath
the failed coup, both the US and the EU criticized Turk-
ish government in responding to the coup, even they did
not take a definitive stance against the coup plotters dur-
ing the initial hours (Ataman & Shkurti, 2017).
Turkey had the capability of assessing the information
of its international environment like what was happening
in Syria and how the external power reacted to its domes-
tic politics. Turkey realized the involvement of Russia in
the crisis and the US and the EU hesitancy in toppling
Assad from power. Turkey considered that both the latter
did not prove a friendly policy after the coup. In contrast,
Russia gave its support to the democratically elected gov-
ernment of Turkey in responding to the coup (Mankoff,
2016). Turkey also perceived Russia’s foreign policy change
in Syria from a direct intervention role to a mediation role
(Reuters, 2016). Russia was engaging in promoting peace
between the Syrian regime and opposition groups and fight-
ing ISIS at the same time.
Decision-making means the process of Turkey’s foreign
policy decision making. The Turkish government had to
take the best option by considering the internal and exter-
nal environment. As a pragmatic and liberal actor, Turkey’s
government combined its liberal value for conflict resolu-
tion and the need for national security to result a new
perspective of policy in Syria. Furthermore, Turkey still
perceived itself as an important regional actor whose am-
bition and active foreign policy character was attached in
its involvement.
The policy created by the process of decision-making
was that Turkey changed its foreign policy strategy in Syria.
Turkey’s previous intervention to maintain its domestic
stability and security from the PKK-PYD activities had been
aimed at replacing the Syrian regime and promoting the
Syrian opposition groups for the country’s new leadership.
The regime change in Syria was the prerequisite to ending
the crisis, create stability in Syria and guarantee the do-
mestic stability in Turkey (Luerdi, 2015). Whereas, the new
form of policy was to engage with Russia in seeking the
conflict resolution in which Turkey reduced its ambition
to topple the regime. Russia was no longer seen as a rival
but a partner for Turkey. The main purpose of this strat-
egy was still to provide stability within Syria which also
meant stability within Turkey. This situation was expected
to restrict the PKK-PYD, and ISIS’ movements in Syria.
Therefore, Turkey would be able to maintain its domestic
order which meant security and stability at home. This
strategy was implemented by Turkey to influence its fu-
ture external environment.
METHODS
The qualitative approach was applied during the re-
search, and the explanatory model of analysis which rais-
ing the independent and dependent variable was applied
to support the approach. The research revealed that do-
mestic and external factors faced by Turkey were the
antecedence of the case studied; meanwhile, Turkey’s for-
eign policy strategy change was the consequence. The tech-
nique applied in gathering data was the library research in
which a variety of data containing relevant information
were collected from books, journals, documents, and use-
ful articles.
The interactive analysis model of Miles and Huberman
was applied to analyse the data. The model of data analy-
sis consists of some activities: (1) data gathering/collec-
tion, (2) data reduction, (3) data display and (4) verifica-
tion or conclusion drawing. The analysis model is called
an interactive model since a series of the activities inter-
twines before, during and after the data gathering in a
parallel form to establish general knowledge called analy-
sis, in other words, the data gathering activity and other
three activities are included in the process of cycle and
interaction (Idrus, 2009).
In this model, the researchers had better be ready to
shift from one activity to the other, starting from the pro-
cess of data gathering, data reduction, data display, and
verification. Therefore, the analysis conducted was a se-
ries of process of activities which repeatedly and constantly
occurred and the activities followed each other. The activi-
ties stopped after a complete report of the research was
finished.
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RESULT AND DISCUSSION
FACTORS ENCOURAGING TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY STRAT-
EGY CHANGE
Domestic Stability and Security
Turkey’s national security interest was perceived as the
protection of territorial integrity where stability as the
ground was also the objective to reach. Domestic stability
and security matter contributed to Turkey’s foreign policy
strategy change in Syrian crisis referring to internal situa-
tions which decision makers could impossibly ignore. Such
internal environment might have been seen the most con-
sidered things before others. While other factors undoubt-
edly strengthened the priority to meet the vital need in
the domestic level. In this case, Turkey’s internal stability
and security were in trouble due to the growing influence
of the PKK and PYD, the ISIS threat and the coup event
that just threatened the ruling government as well as its
domestic order.
For Turkey, domestic stability and security were require-
ments to continue its development and people prosperity.
Turkish previous prime minister, Erdogan (2014) stated
that Turkey achieved a series of good performances in term
of economy and military for more than one decade and
the government was committed to continuing such pres-
tige. Turkey realized such a thing could be maintained and
increased only if domestic stability and security prevailed.
As a country which enjoyed its rising power and its status
as a rising regional actor, Turkey was encouraged to be an
important regional power, especially in the Middle East.
This ambition could be threatened by its domestic insta-
bility and insecurity regarding its intervention policy in
Syria.
The Growing PKK-PYD and ISIS Threats
Turkey and the PKK were enduring a conflicting rela-
tionship since the PKK’s inception in the 1970s. The
Marxist-Leninist group kept championing its demand get-
ting either independence or special autonomy for the south-
eastern territory of Turkey. From the government’s per-
spective, none of its areas should be granted any special
autonomy based on the particular nation since such a policy
would bring the fractures within Turkey. As Erdogan de-
clared (2014), all areas within the country could enjoy the
same rights, and all Turkish nationals were treated equally
despite their nations. Consequently, Turkey kept main-
taining its stance against the PKK.
The PKK was not only a local rebel group operating in
Turkey but also an international organization which re-
ceived sometime supports from foreign governments and
other Kurd groups outside Turkey. Since Syrian regime
withdrew its military forces from northern Syria, the PYD
then became the most important and the powerful Kurd
group in Syria. PYD was believed to be another PKK by
the Turkish government as the PKK created the group to
advocate the Kurds’ interests in Syria. As a sister organiza-
tion of the PKK, PYD was able to be a dominant faction
within Syria’s autonomous northern area because of the
PKK’s support. International Crisis Group recorded that
PKK and PYD shared their fighters in which one-third of
the PKK’s militias were Syrian Kurds (Caves, 2012).
PYD enjoyed the growing of political and military in-
fluence within Syria, and its leadership was gaining popu-
larity support from the Kurds. The PYD and PKK fre-
quently warned Turkey not to intervene Syria especially in
the northern area which mainly conquered by the Kurd
groups. The PYD together with its military wings People’s
Protection Unit (YPG) and Women’s Protection Unit (YPJ)
had effective military movements in resisting the Syrian
opposition groups. Furthermore, the PYD was gaining the
US’ support to fight ISIS in Syria, which in return, dam-
aging Turkey’s security interest. On the other hand, SNC-
FSA faced more difficulties due to their fight against not
only Syrian regime forces along with foreign militias com-
ing from Syria’s allies but also the PYD and ISIS’ fighters.
The PKK conducted several deadly attacks in Turkey
even more frequently, especially in the areas near the Tur-
key-Syria border, because of its foreign policy in Syria.
Turkey believed that the capability both the PYD-PKK
could not be separated from the Syrian regime support.
Syria’s policy to grant autonomy to the Kurds was a counter-
policy to resist Turkey’s intervention as well as defending
the area from the opposition groups (Luerdi, 2015). Be-
sides, Turkey once declared the Syrian regime’s involve-
ment in PKK’s attacks within its territory (Erdogan, 2014).
The ISIS was another actor who devastated Turkey’s
domestic stability. The group was able to conquer many of
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areas in Syria and fight against all its enemies in the coun-
try. The ISIS already carried out several attacks targeting
Turkey’s facilities, citizens and foreigners and demanded
the Turkish government to withdraw its support to SNC-
FSA. Turkey previously blamed the ISIS for several deadly
attacks which were resulted by the consequence of its in-
volvement in Syria.
Compared to the situation before the crisis, the num-
ber of attacks was growing since Turkey intervened Syria.
From early 2015 until early 2017, Aljazeera (Aljazeera, 2017)
recorded the twenties of attacks harming both facilities
and people. Turkey used to face the threats from the PKK
such as bombs and abductions for decades (Mango, 2005);
however, the PKK increased its attacks as retaliation for
Turkish government’s firm intervention against the Kurds’
interest in Syria, and so did the ISIS.
Turkey realized that the risk of its domestic security
and stability became the consequence for its foreign policy
principle in Syria. The country seemed to be unable to
block the conflict from entering its border. The devastat-
ing security and stability at home could be a bad image for
Turkey as a regional actor and invite more criticisms from
national opposing parties and its citizens. Thus, the Turk-
ish government needed to reconsider its foreign policy in
Syria.
Leaving Syria with a stalemated conflict was not a good
choice either as Turkey consistently maintained its domes-
tic interest for stability and security. The PKK and ISIS
remained the threats for Turkey as the groups invested their
political movements and influence within Syria. Turkey
still believed that its intervention was necessary to create
stability within Syria which then meant stability to the
country as well. Therefore, the new form of Turkey’s for-
eign policy strategy still purposively created stability. How-
ever, Turkey’s new foreign policy strategy was to bring Russia
as a partner in attempts for stability in Syria and decreased
its regime problem rhetoric against the Syrian regime.
The Coup Event over the Turkish Government
Turkey had experienced a series of coup attempts,
mostly successful, carried out by the military to topple the
ruling regimes. The early coup attempt took place in 1960
to replace the regime which the military considered ac-
commodative to Islamists. The 1971 coup was in response
to the increasing of left-wing groups and the effort to cre-
ate stability where the military believed the ruling govern-
ment was not capable of guaranteeing such public good.
Post-1980 coup, the military began to dominate the
Turkish politics by restricting political rights of political
parties and civilians. Turkish military became the supreme
actor determining who could be elected to be leaders for
the country. A few years later, military handed in the power
to civilians and political parties; however, the military with
its special rights still overshadowed Turkish home politics.
In 1997, the military conducted another coup to remove
the existing Islamist rulers whose views were considered
the threat for the ideology of Kemalism and secularism
(Alfian, 2015).
The Turkish government already put efforts to restrict
the military intervention in domestic politics especially
after the referendum of the constitutional amendment in
2010. Since then, the civilian government enjoyed such
change and gained enough support from the military, es-
pecially in term of the government domestic policy against
the PKK and foreign policy in Syria.
However, the government did not gain the support from
the whole military institution which ended up with the
2016 coup attempt carried out by a faction in the military
which the government believed to have a connection with
the movement of Fethullah Gulen, a Pennsylvania-based
cleric. Gulen had followers within Turkish institutions such
as judiciary, military, police department and others. The
coup was followed by the bombing attempt over the parlia-
ment building and kidnapping of joint chief of staff and
caused 241 dead, and more than 2,194 were injured
(Anadolu, 2016).
The coup was conducted amid Turkey’s activism in the
Syrian crisis and domestic threats from the PKK and ISIS.
The coup attempt complicated the problem of the Turk-
ish government had to accomplish. It meant the security
and stability the country fought for were vulnerable from
not only the PKK and ISIS but also any military faction at
home. The government realized that to create domestic
security and stability needed full support from the mili-
tary institution. The military aid was also required by the
Turkish government to extend its policy across the border
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to face the PKK-PYD and ISIS.
For the Turkish government, the actors threatening
Turkey could take advantages of the coup event. They could
have thought that the policy makers within Turkey secured
only little legitimacy due to partial support from its mili-
tary where in the future they could set more attacks. The
coup was celebrated by the Syrian regime supporters
(Hindawi, 2016). The Turkish government detained a num-
ber of Kurdish politicians and activists who were consid-
ered being either involved in the coup or linked to the
PKK in response to the coup attempt.
Such a situation encouraged Turkey to change its for-
eign policy strategy in Syria. Turkey’s previous stance to
demand the regime change in Syria did not work smoothly
as expected. On the other hand, the domestic threat to its
stability was increasing as the Syrian regime warned and
expected when Turkey began its intervention. Turkey al-
ready directed its foreign policy to attract Russia to be an
ally to facilitate conflict resolution within Syria. Stability
within Syria was believed to contribute stability at home,
or the Turkish government would be able to give more
attention to tackle threats coming from within.
External Powers’ Stands on Syrian Crisis and Turkey’s
Domestic Politics
Not only did Turkey consider its domestic situation
seriously, but it also perceived international environment
in the region which was able to influence the policy-mak-
ing. Syria was the ground in which many international
interests met, not only regional actors’ but also extra-re-
gional actors’ preserving the endless conflict in the coun-
try. Turkey was one of the regional actors that earliest and
most open who showed its opposition to the Syrian re-
gime and propagated that the existing regime was the caus-
ing problem of the crisis (Kouskouvelis, 2013). Turkey’s
sharp regime problem rhetoric lasted until 2016 when the
crisis was becoming more uncertain with the absence of
the conflict resolution and, on the other hand, the Syrian
regime was becoming more powerful with its allies’ sup-
ports.
After a five-year intervention, Turkey could not gain
the output of the decision makers had designed, replacing
the Syrian regime with the Syrian opposition groups likely
able to control the stability and the Kurds within Syria.
The balance of power presence between Russia and the
US as well as the EU’s reluctance to fully support the op-
position groups incorporated in SNC-FSA became the
main reason why Turkey’s intervention did not work
(Luerdi, 2015).
Besides the external powers’ stands on the Syrian cri-
sis, Turkey experienced different responses from those great
powers regarding its domestic political situation post-2016
coup attempt. The Turkish government needed interna-
tional supports so that the country could survive in the
middle of domestic threats and regional uncertainty due
to the Syrian crisis. Turkey had to calculate its foreign policy
in Syria, encouraged by these external actors’ roles both in
the Syrian crisis and its domestic politics.
Russia’s Role in Syrian Crisis and Its Stand on Turkey’s
Domestic Politics
Russia was an important ally for Syria, and therefore, it
had significant contributions to the Syrian regime’s sur-
vival. The country already supported the regime as the le-
gitimate government of the Syrian people from the begin-
ning of the crisis as Syria helped maintain its geostrategic
interest in the Middle East. Many believed that Russia
would not let Syria have the same fate as Libya whose re-
gime was toppled by NATO (Express, 2017). Instead, it
would be consistent in defending the regime from the for-
eign intervention as Syria was the only loyal ally left in the
region.
Russia already carried out a series of roles to strengthen
the position of the Syrian regime, both political and mili-
tary. Russia showed its side to Syria in the United Nations
Security Council’s deliberations for the conflict resolutions
and sanctions against the regime. Russia always condemned
the international actors for blaming the regime for atroci-
ties and used its veto to abort any decision made by the
Security Council targeting the regime.
Russia was also active in conferences related to Syria
such as Geneva Conferences, dialogues seeking for the best
solution for the Syrian crisis sponsored by the United
Nations and other countries including Turkey. While Tur-
key stood against the Syrian regime and was in favor of
Syrian opposition groups’ demand for the regime change
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and creation of a transitional government in Syria, Russia
took side with the regime rejecting any outsider interven-
tion and preferring the solution determined by the Syrian
people.
Russia kept exporting its weapons into Syria in spite of
the ongoing conflict and international criticisms (Connolly
& Sendstad, 2017). Furthermore, at the Syrian regime’s
request, Russia sent its military personnel along with air-
craft to assist the regime against all of the rebel groups
within the country, not only the ISIS but also the opposi-
tion forces. Russia and Syria had bombed the rebels’ basis
several times though the actions caused the civilian vic-
tims and were condemned by the United Nations as well
as Turkey.
Turkey realized that Russia would not step back from
backing the Syrian regime unless there was a significant
change and its position would determine the dynamics of
the conflict. Russia’s intervention in Syria was becoming
stronger compared to the earlier years of the conflict. The
hardship which the opposition groups backed by Turkey
faced was not easily removed as long as Russia stood with
the Syrian regime. Moreover, the United Nations, along
with its Security Council, was unable to stop Russia as its
permanent member status.
Instead of seeing Russia as a rival in Syria, Turkey fi-
nally perceived Russia as a partner in seeking the conflict
resolution. On the other hand, Russia had a historical
perception of Turkey as one of the most essential coun-
tries in the region and the area gatekeeper (Eran, 2005).
Besides, Turkey saw a shift in Russian foreign policy from
direct intervention to a mediator even though the country
was still interested in maintaining the existing Syrian re-
gime. Russia was willing to negotiate to end the conflict
even with the Syrian opposition groups (Business Insider,
2016). For Turkey, Russia had more concern about Syrian
conflict than other actors like the US and the EU.
International reactions to the Turkish government’s
measure to maintain domestic stability post-2016 coup also
mattered. Turkey received a series of criticisms from for-
eign countries since the government conducted harsh ac-
tions towards many people suspected to be engaged in the
coup and the PKK organization. Meanwhile, Turkey re-
ceived a supportive stand from Russia which recognized
its democratically elected leader and condemned the un-
lawful coup. It was unconditional political support from
Russia to Turkish government compared to its western al-
lies.
Turkey found its moment to change its foreign policy
strategy in Syria. Russia’s support to its domestic political
matter was able to accumulate the need of current policy’s
new strategy in Syria besides the more increasing Russia’s
roles. Russia could be a possible ally for Turkey to create
stability in Syria after a several-month disharmony.
The United States and the European Union’s Differing
Orientations in Syrian Crisis and Their Stands on
Turkey’s Domestic Politics
The US and the EU used to be Turkey’s allies in Syrian
crisis before Turkey reconsidered its foreign policy. Those
countries condemned the Syrian regime as the regime that
was not willing to give up the power and did not have any
plan to create a transitional government to stop the vio-
lence against its people nor allowed democratization in
Syria.
The two actors had worked together with Turkey in
gaining international support to press the Syrian regime.
Turkey expected those actors would be sufficient to end
the regime through their roles in the United Nations and
NATO as well as maximizing its role in international fora.
The US and the EU had backed some conflict resolutions
deliberated in the United Nations’ Security Council to
resolve the crisis and investigate the Syrian regime and
possibly bring the regime to International Criminal Court.
However, the efforts were always vetoed by Syria’s allies,
mainly Russia.
Meanwhile, Turkey expected the immediate measure
to topple the Syrian regime as the longer the regime stayed,
the more threats it faced. As a member of NATO, Turkey
had also preferred the security organization to take a simi-
lar action like what it did in Libya to remove the regime.
Erdogan (2014) stated that Turkey would provide its mili-
tary base provided that the military actions were conducted
with an international mandate as well as participating in
the mission. Realizing Russia’s position in the Syrian cri-
sis, a member of permanent five, the sanction and pres-
sure to the Syrian regime through the United Nations were
barely effective.
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Even though the US, the EU, and Turkey together sup-
ported the Syrian opposition groups, the latter had more
commitment to their struggle against the Syrian regime.
Not only did Turkey facilitate the inception of SNC-FSA,
but it was also hosting them on its ground, training the
fighters and opening its border to ease their movements.
In the international level, Turkey invited many countries
to support the opposition body as the legitimate represen-
tative of Syrian people against dictatorship through Friends
of Syria (Luerdi, 2015). Meanwhile, the SNC’s member,
Mubarak (2014), stated that the western countries did not
keep their promise to the opposition groups since they
were reluctant to help the opposition forces fully and in-
stead, they left the groups in internal conflict.
Turkey realized that both the US and the EU had
shifted their policy in Syria. They were no longer inter-
ested in removing the Syrian regime and supporting the
opposition groups. Instead, the US preferred to direct its
foreign policy to counter the ISIS within Syria by support-
ing the Syrian Kurds, and among whom the PYD (YPG)
were the most reliable ally. The US contributed to consoli-
date the military forces in northern Syria to face the ISIS’
fighters and take over the areas from its conquest by form-
ing the SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) in 2015 (Almasri,
2017).
For Turkey, the US’ move was against its security inter-
est. The PYD was the PKK’s sister organization which was
still labeled a terrorist group by the Turkish government.
The PYD had shown its opposition to Turkey’s policy in
Syria, supporting the Syrian opposition groups to conquer
the areas, especially in northern Syria. The US ignored
Turkey’s rejection of the PYD-USA engagement since the
group was the most powerful and effective body to counter
the ISIS in Syria.
The EU, on the other hand, preferred to give more
attention to the refugee problem resulted by the crisis rather
than the regime problem and Syrian opposition groups.
UNICEF (2016) recorded more than 1.2 million refugees
migrating into Europe since 2015, including from Syria
mainly through southeastern Europe. The EU was facing
the security threats with the existence of the refugees on
their land. Furthermore, rejections were coming from the
member countries and their nationals for its policy to host
refugees fleeing from conflict countries. Though the EU
and Turkey had talked over sharing the refugee problem
through some negotiations and in return, Turkey de-
manded more roles from the EU in Syria, the institution
did not show more willingness to intervene to remove the
Syrian regime.
The US and the EU stands after the failed coup in
Turkey were taken into account. The US and the EU criti-
cized the Turkish government’s measure to return the sta-
bility in the country which they considered contrary to
Turkish democracy and accused it of being an authoritar-
ian regime. For Turkey, such reaction was not a friendly
policy as allies should show, otherwise typical western
double standard. Turkey already risked its negotiation with
the EU regarding the visa-free policy and endangered its
EU membership chance since its domestic stability was
the most important.
Realizing its differing allies’ stands on the Syrian crisis
and domestic politics encouraged Turkey to reconsider its
foreign policy in Syria. What was expected from the US
and the EU; Turkey could not achieve their consistency of
policies and their regard over its home stability need. Mean-
while, Turkey saw Russia could cooperate to return stabil-
ity within Syria without losing its need for domestic stabil-
ity. The US and the EU were no longer reliable allies since
they chased their interests by risking Turkey’s interest.
Turkey’s Foreign Policy Strategy Change
The considerations of domestic and external factors
encouraged Turkey to change its foreign policy strategy in
Syria. Inasmuch as Turkey still maintained its vital inter-
est in security and stability, the country still directed its
foreign policy in Syria. Turkey would not keep a distance
to its neighboring conflict as its foreign policy was always
formulated with reference of historical trends and a sense
of active agency as well as a geographical positioning
(Davutoðlu, 2012). However, Turkey’s foreign policy shifted
to more mediation role. Turkey considered Russia as a re-
liable partner in seeking the resolution for the durable
Syrian conflict; as a result, it reduced its rhetoric against
the Syrian regime. Instead, Turkey and Russia promoted
the dialogues between the regime and the opposition
groups. Such Turkey’s foreign policy strategy change could
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be indicated by the two countries’ rapprochement, Mos-
cow Declaration, and Astana Peace Talks.
Turkey-Russia Rapprochement
Turkey had severed its diplomatic relation with Russia
by shooting down the Russian warplane in November 2015
which it claimed that the jet entered the Turkish territory.
Meanwhile, Russia blamed Turkey for the accident since
the jet was still in Syrian territory. Russia’s military pres-
ence in Syria was at the Syrian regime’s request to attack
the radical groups. However, Turkey criticized the Russian
military moves because they targeted not only the ISIS fight-
ers but also the Syrian opposition groups.
Russia had taken some policies to respond Turkey’s
action such as mainly economic sanctions. Russia sus-
pended its trade and tourism with Turkey and imposed
restrictions on Turkish companies and nationals in Rus-
sia as well as suspending the visa-free arrangement with
Turkey. The other disadvantageous policy that Turkey suf-
fered as a growing industrialist country was Russia’s deci-
sion to reduce its gas flowing to the country and the sus-
pended work on a Black Sea pipeline that should allow
more gas flows to Turkish industry (DW, 2015).
After months of deteriorated diplomatic relation with
Russia amid the enduring Syrian conflict, Turkey decided
to officially settle its tie after sending an official letter to
the Government of Russia. Turkey officially extended its
apology to Russian people and expressed its condolence
to the Russian pilot who was the victim of Turkish mili-
tary shot in the Syria-Turkey border. In return, Russia lifted
its economic sanctions over Turkey, and the two countries
could continue the trade and other kinds of cooperation
as they used to have. The most important part of the two
countries’ rapprochement was the declaration of commit-
ment against terrorism in Syria and readiness to work to-
gether to seek a solution for the Syrian conflict.
For Turkey, the diplomatic rapprochement with Rus-
sia was an important policy for its intervention continuity
from which it would be able to pursue its domestic secu-
rity and stability interest regarding the conflict in Syria.
Such policy was an initial move of its new foreign policy
strategy. Russia could not be separated from the conflict
resolution seeking as it had invested interest in the region
as well. Engaging with Russia was the most rational choice
for Turkish government instead of relying on its western
allies. Only by the rapprochement could Turkey cooper-
ate with Russia in facilitating and mediating the warring
parties in Syria.
Moscow Declaration
The Western actors mainly the US along with the
United Nations had worked to make progress for the Syr-
ian conflict de-escalation, but they did not make signifi-
cant gains for a better situation. Otherwise, the conflict
continued causing more victims and maintained a sharp
difference between the Syrian regime and opposition
groups. Several efforts initiated by the United Nations to
mediate the crisis failed, and the US calls for the regime
change did not work either. The latter preferred to risk
more costs on the ISIS within Syria.
Moscow Declaration was initiated by Turkey and Rus-
sia, by involving Iran as another important actor in the
crisis, as a reaction to the US’ failure attempts to make
significant gains in Syria. The declaration was a calling for
an expanded cease-fire in which Turkey and Russia would
be the guarantors (Eren, 2017). The two countries had a
capability of taking such a move since they had links di-
rectly to the conflicting parties. Turkey had a connection
to oppositions groups; on the other hand, Russia was the
Syrian regime backer. The two countries became the me-
diators and facilitators that could bring the conflicting
parties to the negotiation table with their supervision.
Moscow Declaration was conducted without the in-
volvement of the US and the United Nations since Tur-
key and Russia would like to have more roles in the crisis.
Furthermore, as the Turkish foreign minister stated the
declaration was not only for the Syrian regime and opposi-
tion groups but also for other connected groups support-
ing either of them (New York Times, 2016). The declara-
tion was followed by the cease-fire and the evacuation of
the opposition fighters.
Moscow Declaration was an event showing Turkey-
Russia cooperation in the Syrian crisis to provide stability
in the country. Turkey which was backing the Syrian op-
position groups was willing to bring them into negotia-
tion forum with the Syrian regime only after the cease-
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fire. Russia which already cost a lot for the Syrian regime,
agreed to do the same thing, bringing the regime to nego-
tiation forum with the opposition groups. Such joint dec-
laration strengthened Turkey’s foreign policy strategy
change in Syrian crisis by which Turkey was able to fur-
ther steps to engage with Russia in creating stability in
Syria which was considered an important contribution to
its domestic security and stability as well.
Astana Peace Talk Rounds
Turkey-Russia declaration included plans to have a se-
ries of peace talks in Astana, Kazakhstan, where the repre-
sentatives of both Syrian regime and opposition groups
could meet directly in the peace process. Although the
United Nations was not the initiator of the peace talk
rounds, the institution supported the Turkey and Russia’s
attempt. The United Nations, the US, and other coun-
tries could participate only as observers, while Turkey,
Russia and Iran were the actors guaranteeing the process
and the results of the negotiations.
By the end of 2017, Turkey and Russia-Iran had con-
ducted eight peace talks with a variety of issues negotiated
such as a cease-fire, de-escalation zones, refugees and the
humanitarian issues covering the issues of exchange de-
tainees, prisoners of war and missing people (Astana Times,
2017). The peace talks not only discussed over the new
issues concerned by the two conflicting parties but also
proceeded those in previously stagnant Geneva conferences
which were once conducted by the United Nations.
Despite some insignificant results of the Astana Peace
Talks, Turkey seemed to be committed to the peace pro-
cess rounds and collaboration with Russia which is con-
sidered more effective and promising rather than the west-
ern allies. Turkey perceived Russia’s commitment as a guar-
antor in Syria during the peace talks, and it was strength-
ened by Russia’s policy to withdraw its military presence
in Syria. Besides, the two countries were willing to bring
other actors who were related to either the Syrian regime
or opposition groups.
Turkey’s attempt to conduct and guarantee the Astana
Peace Talks with Russia was an action that indicated its
foreign policy strategy change in Syria. Turkey perceived
that the United Nations’ efforts and western countries’
commitment did not work to achieve a better situation in
Syria; otherwise the situation in the country caused more
instability and uncertainty which also harmed its domes-
tic security and stability. Instead, Turkey collaborated with
Russia to take over the western countries role in seeking
conflict resolution.
CONCLUSION
From the analysis above, it could be concluded that
internal and external environment followed by the deci-
sion-making process in Turkey, encouraged the country to
change its foreign policy strategy in the Syrian crisis. Since
its early intervention in 2011, Turkey had been embracing
its domestic security and stability as vital national interest
so that it would like to take any necessary action or policy
to pursue such interests. Turkey’s intervention in this stage
had been directed to purposively topple the Syrian regime
and replace it with the Syrian opposition groups by build-
ing an alliance with the western actors and by which, the
new regime in Syria would be able to create stability and
resist the PKK-PYD influence in Syria.
However, in 2016, Turkey reconsidered its internal and
external environment amid the stalemated war in Syria
and evaluating its foreign policy which had not yet yielded
the outcome as expected by its decision makers. The grow-
ing PKK-PYD and ISIS’ threats and the coup event which
then emphasized the importance of home security and sta-
bility were internal factors Turkey concerned; meanwhile
extra-regional actors’ behaviors like Russia, the US, and
the EU as external factors strengthened its domestic situa-
tion. As the information assessment, Turkey perceived
Russia’s foreign policy shift from a direct intervention role
supporting the Syrian regime to a mediator role besides its
unconditional support after the coup. Meanwhile, the US
and the EU took a different direction.
Turkey changed its foreign policy strategy. It was then
engaging Russia as a reliable partner to create stability and
end the conflict within Syria. However, the purpose of its
foreign policy was still alike; the pursuit of domestic secu-
rity and stability. Turkey’s foreign policy strategy change
began with the two countries’ diplomatic rapprochement
from which they could continue to other attempts such as
the Moscow Declaration and the Astana Peace Talks in
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which they acted as the guarantors.
Turkey is one of the world emerging forces whose for-
eign policy is increasingly active especially in the region
where it lies. In the case of Syrian conflict, Turkey is an
important actor which great power should consider regard-
ing their interests, and it could be either a rival or a friend.
Next, to the finding above, this article revealed that Syria
was highly dynamic as it was a meeting point of interests
of numerous actors. Regional and extra regional actors
would consider the changing situation surrounding it, in-
cluding Turkey.
The topic in this paper might be interesting as well if
other researchers would analyze it from different perspec-
tives, especially whether Turkey’s realignment with Russia
has worked better to bring the conflict resolution in Syria
and security in Turkey and the region of the Middle East.
Even though the findings can be different, they will de-
velop more understanding of Turkey’s foreign policy and
will benefit those who are studying and lecturing the is-
sues of Turkey’s foreign policy.
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